One of the factors that can be the link between our intentions and actions and their external consequences is human Agency, which indicates the conscious design and intentional execution of actions by the individual in order to influence future events.Objective and Method: This research with a developmental approach of psychometric method and method 1, examines the psychometric indices of the Human Factor Characteristics Scale using the classical theory of test score measurement and the graduated question-answer theory. The purpose of this study, which included high school students in Tehran, was selected by cluster sampling of 500 people as a sample size and statistical analysis was performed on 481 data. To collect the data, the ion Human Agent Characteristics Scale (2011) was used and the research questions were evaluated using IRTPRO and SPSS software.Results:The assumption of local independence based on Pearson x2 index was established by applying Simjima's calibrated question-answer theory and the assumption of being one-dimensional based on the analysis of multidimensional question-answer theory. Diagnosis parameters with question-answer approach and classical approach Test score Both item 25 approach had the lowest and item 2 had the highest diagnosis parameter. The answer thresholds for all the questions were so far apart that no option was covered by the other option, and the options were independently selected by individuals at intervals of theta. The total scale was calculated with Cronbach's alpha of 0.945, intentionality of 0.894, foresight of 0.780, self-reactivity of 0.871 and rethinking of 0.762. Also, the role of each item in internal consistency was investigated by the loop method, which all questions had a favorable role in internal consistency of this scale. The value of the validity coefficient obtained from the question-answer theory was obtained by marginal method for intentionality 0.92, forethought 0.85, self-reaction 0.91, rethinking 0.83..

The positive approach and its follower, the Agency theory, have had a great impact upon the line of research in accounting field. Based on the Agency theory, “company” includes a set of conventional relations and its aim is maximizing the shareholders’ wealth. Because of different purposes, self-interest, and opportunism, there is constant conflicts of interest between the brokers and agents; meanwhile, the theory of Agency is seeking some strategies to minimize the costs of this conflict. In this paper, the principles of the theory of Agency are explained and the criticisms directed to this theory are analyzed through ethics perspective. The paper adopts an analytico-descriptive structure and for collecting theoretical principles and materials, documentary and library methods were used. Because of limited and simplistic perspective as well as ignoring the ethical norms and social aspects, the Agency theory has a limited capacity to describe and predict human behaviors.

The purpose of this paper is to philosophically address the issue of managerial opportunism and to describe the paradox of the opportunistic executive, particularly when the CEO could be considered as a “ criminal-to-be” . Also, It will be seen to what extent governance mechanisms really contribute to prevent managerial opportunism, particularly through compensation packages (“ financial carrots” ). Then, Oliver Williamson’ s viewpoint will be analyzed on opportunism, as his theory has largely influenced the way Agency theories actually define managerial opportunism. The gap in exploring three basic types of opportunism (the Smithian egoist, the Hobbesian egoist and the Machiavellian egoist) will be filled. The results indicate that The Smithian egoist tries to reach equilibrium between self-interest and compassion, while the Hobbesian egoist is motivated by self-interest, desire of power and the attitude of prudence. The Machiavellian egoist is always searching for power and makes followers’ fear arising. The way governance mechanisms and structures should be designed and implemented could be quite different if the CEO actually behaves as a Smithian, Hobbesian or Machiavellian egoist. CEO’ s propensity to commit financial crime could largely vary from one type to another: low risk (Smithian egoist), medium risk (Hobbesian egoist) or high risk (Machiavellian egoist). Smith’ s, Hobbes’ and Machiavelli’ s philosophy was chosen because the Agency theory sometimes refers to it, when defining the notion of opportunism. Other philosophies could also be analyzed to see to what extent they are opening the door to opportunism (for example, Spinoza).

The financial perspective of behavior, which is a combination of psychology and finance, states that psychology plays a role in financial decision-making. Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to present a portfolio selection model with a financial-behavioral perspective of company managers based on Agency theory. The present study was conducted in two steps. In the first step, the dimensions of the components of behavioral financial theories based on the theory of representation, the relationships between these variables are explained in the form of a mathematical model. The calculations of this section have been done by Mathematica software. In the second step, using the price index data and cash return of Tehran Stock Exchange for quarterly periods over a period of 10 years from the beginning of 1389 to the end of 1398 to test the proposed behavioral financial model with the theory of representation in the portfolio Optimization and comparison with the classic model are discussed. The analysis of the second step was performed by means of comparison of means with SPSS software. The results of the analysis of two standard and behavioral models in the present study showed that the behavioral model led to the achievement of a portfolio with less risk and the returns of the portfolios are not significantly different.

Purpose: Studies in the field of corporate governance have tried to formulate a model that is compatible with all companies with different goals by using of Agency theory. On the other hand, some researchers emphasize on presenting a contingency perspective. The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between the board structure and corporate social responsibility by considering the role of contingency factors. Method: The research data includes 128 companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period of 2016 to 2021. Structural equation modeling and SmartPLS3 software were used to test the hypotheses. The three factors of firm size, business strategy and business competition have considered as contingency factors that affect the board structure. Results: Contingency factors including firm size, business strategy and business competition have a positive and significant effect on the board structure, and the board structure has a significant mediating effect on the relationship between the contingency factors and corporate social responsibility. Conclusion: Companies with a strong strategy, large size and high business competitiveness have a more efficient board structure. Contingency factors are among the factors affecting the board structure, and the fitting of the board structure with contingency factors lead to improve corporate social responsibility. Contribution: Studies based on Agency theory are unable to explain the effectiveness of the board of directors in the field of corporate social responsibility due to having a narrow theoretical lens. By providing a contingency framework, this study contribute to the existing literature, and helps the legislators to formulate new guidelines and laws.